




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


National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

17 February 1979

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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SITUATION REPORTS

IRAN

The execution of four senior military officers yesterday is likely to lead to further confusion in the Iranian military. Nonetheless, the government appears intent on a major purge of the armed forces command structure.

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Vice Prime Minister Yazdi said yesterday that there will be additional executions of former officials of the Shah's regime. Reports of impending purges in the military are apparently widespread-- rumors that 154 generals and admirals have been arrested. Prime Minister Bazargan and Ayatollah Khomeini clearly remain suspicious of the military, and Khomeini's supporters in the military are probably pressing him to punish their enemies.

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According to the announcement on Radio Tehran, the Revolutionary Court convicted the four generals executed yesterday of "torture, killing the people, treason to the country, and sedition." All four were strongly and openly opposed to Khomeini and participated in decisions which led to the shooting of demonstrators during the past few months.

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The executions and the display of the bodies to the press were probably meant in part to intimidate other officers who do not support Khomeini's goals. The indications from Vice Prime Minister Yazdi that additional trials will be held will also serve to unnerve those who had endorsed efforts to suppress the opposition.

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Some senior officers support Khomeini's efforts and have been allowed to retain their posts or have been elevated to replace supporters of the old regime.

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25X1 [redacted]

Security remains unsettled. Tehran radio claimed yesterday that progovernment forces have restored order in Tabriz, but other reports suggest the situation is still unstable. In Tehran scattered shooting occurred around the Embassy yesterday. Most of the unease in the capital continues to appear to be the work of the leftist Chariks group. [redacted]

25X1 Chariks' Foreign Backers

Little solid evidence is available about the extent of outside support for the Chariks. A Chariks spokesman this week told the press that the group welcomed support from "socialist" countries but not from the USSR and China. Nonetheless, we believe the Chariks would probably accept Soviet support if it were offered. In the past the Chariks have received some support from various radical Arab groups including South Yemen and the Palestinians. [redacted]

25X1 We have little information on current South Yemeni support for Iranian leftists, although some recently published Charik propaganda gives an Aden return address. In the mid-1970s some Chariks received training at Palestinian bases in South Yemen, but the extent of government involvement is not clear. [redacted]

25X1 Fatah, the largest Palestinian organization, has longstanding ties to Khomeini and has provided training and aid to his followers. Fatah does not appear to be significantly involved with Iranian leftists, but more radical Palestinian groups--particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--may have supplied training and arms. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

--continued

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[REDACTED]

Libya has over the years provided some arms and training to Iranian dissidents, primarily through its connections with radical Palestinian groups, and since the successes of Khomeini has stepped up its assistance. We have no evidence, however, that Libyans have consciously aided the Chariks or any other Marxist-oriented anti-Shah faction, although such groups might have received Libyan weapons through Palestinian patronage. Tripoli gave an early and strong endorsement of the Bazar-gan government, is pleased with the emergence of an Islamic revolution in Iran, and probably would not want to encourage Marxists, who have never been to President Qadhafi's ideological liking. [REDACTED]

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The Chariks have long been able to secure arms inside Iran by raiding police stations and armories, and in the last few days have acquired large quantities of weapons. They would appear to have little need for outside support to get more weapons. [REDACTED]

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Tudeh's Backers

The USSR was deeply involved in the creation of the Tudeh Party and has remained its primary patron. In recent years, the Soviets seldom mentioned the Tudeh Party publicly, but since September they have published or broadcast some party communiques. Yesterday TASS published a Tudeh appeal to striking Iranian workers to return to work today--supporting Khomeini's earlier plea that strikes should end. [REDACTED]

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Other Soviet allies also support the Tudeh. East Germany has long been host to the exiled Tudeh leadership, for example. The Tudeh has long had cordial relations with the ruling Marxist party in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

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CHINA-VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA

China yesterday stepped up its war of words with Vietnam with a protest of "barbarous atrocities" along the border. The Chinese issued what they termed their "strongest protest" over incidents that occurred between 8 and 12 February; recent notes had been characterized as "strong." To our knowledge, Beijing last used the term "strongest protest" in April 1962, some five months before the outbreak of the border war with India.

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The protest charges the Vietnamese with planting mines on Chinese territory that killed or wounded 34 Chinese and with firing on a train near the western part of the border with Vietnam.

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Vietnam-Kampuchea-USSR

Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong arrived in the Kampuchean capital yesterday with a high-level delegation. With Dong are the Foreign Minister, the chief aid negotiator, and the Chief of Staff, all of whom are Politburo members. This is the first official visit to Kampuchea by Vietnamese leaders since the invasion. Dong reportedly may sign a treaty with the pro-Hanoi Heng Samrin government that will formally allow Vietnam to station forces in Kampuchea. He may also announce a Vietnamese aid package for Phnom Penh.

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Ros Samay, Secretary General of the Kampuchean United Front, arrived in Moscow yesterday following a tour in Eastern Europe. He is expected to meet senior Soviet officials during his stay.

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Dubs Affair

The role played by Soviet personnel in guiding the Afghan police operation that resulted in Ambassador Dubs' death reflects the Soviets' readiness to go to considerable lengths to help the Taraki regime put down challenges from its opponents. [REDACTED]

The events on Tuesday reinforce our belief that Soviet advisers might well play an operational role on the side of the regime if it came under a direct armed threat to its survival. [REDACTED]

Soviet media handling of the incident indicates that Moscow wants to limit the damage from the US charges. The Soviets have portrayed the Ambassador's death as a regrettable incident caused by "enemies of the Afghan people and opponents of US-Afghan friendship." They have not publicized the US protest over the role of Soviet advisers, but TASS has criticized US press coverage of the event. In an indirect response to the US protest, TASS referred to "absurd" stories about the involvement of persons "who in reality had nothing to do with the event." [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN: Kidnapers

//The Afghan Government is asserting that the terrorists involved in the kidnaping and death of Ambassador Dubs were members of a radical leftist organization opposed to the dominant position of the Pushtun ethnic group. Earlier, the US Embassy in Kabul had concluded that the kidnapers probably were religious dissidents. The regime, already plagued by continuing tribal insurgency in the eastern provinces and growing opposition from religious groups elsewhere, may have chosen to overwhelm the terrorists in this case--despite the threat to the Ambassador--as a lesson to their opponents.//

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Oppressed Nation Party may have allied itself with a large gang of criminals who banded together prior to the coup last April to carry out nighttime raids, robberies, and assaults on government installations. This group may contain several hundred members.//

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//The government's forceful reaction to the kidnaping suggests it is determined to quash as quickly and strongly as possible any organization that might appeal to ethnic or religious dissidents.//

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[REDACTED]

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CHAD: Situation in Capital

Ndjamena is quiet as the French and Sudanese work to establish a cease-fire, which would be the third "truce" since fighting began on Monday. Supporters of Muslim Prime Minister Habre continue to control most of the city. President Malloum is reportedly seeking French assistance in leaving the capital and has relinquished all authority to gendarmerie commander Kamougue, a bitter foe of Habre. The French are continuing to evacuate Europeans through Gabon and have agreed to fly US citizens to Cameroon.

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There are unconfirmed reports that a new government may be formed soon, with Defense Minister Djime as President and Habre as Vice President. Djime, a Christian, was Vice President before Habre joined the government last August, and is probably being suggested as a compromise candidate acceptable to Kamougue and other hard-line southerners. Unless Habre is given the political power he believes he deserves, however, he is unlikely to agree to such an arrangement.

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Whoever emerges on top probably will be preoccupied with consolidating his position--and seeking to make deals with Muslim rebels not involved in the current action--and is unlikely to take actions inimical to US interests, at least in the short term.

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NICARAGUA: Widening Violence

//With President Somoza prepared to ride out the storm in Nicaragua until his term ends in 1981, the country is settling into a pattern of almost daily terrorism, growing brutality by both sides, and widening-- although containable--urban violence.// [REDACTED]

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//Several factors point toward some step-up in guerilla action and an increase in indiscriminate terrorism, although another sustained large-scale offensive such as last September's remains unlikely. All Sandinista guerilla factions now recognize that lower risk operations are in order for what they expect to be a drawn-out struggle. Small-unit ambushes and assassinations of Somoza supporters or collaborators are steadily increasing. The current three-month dry season permits expanded guerilla activity, and the Sandinistas probably also hope to take advantage of Venezuelan President Perez' support during his last month in office.// [REDACTED]

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//The National Guard--determined to exterminate the Sandinistas by 1981--has continued to maul larger guerilla concentrations; 95 Sandinistas were killed or captured in northern Nicaragua in early January alone. Losses in rural actions will probably force the Sandinistas to concentrate even more on urban attacks. Sandinista targeting of individual Guardsmen, however, has only encouraged brutality by a Guard already inclined to indiscriminate killings. [REDACTED]

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//The general atmosphere permits the settling of local scores, and with unemployment escalating, banditry is on the increase. Criminals are almost certainly using the Sandinista banner for cover. Heretofore unknown organizations have made crude efforts to intimidate leftists, and there is a potential for expanding counter-terror.// [REDACTED]

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//Somoza has kept the capital largely calm, protected the financially important cotton and coffee harvests now under way, and remains reasonably confident of holding on.// [REDACTED]

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PORTUGAL: Budget Proposals

The tough new budget proposals presented to Parliament yesterday by Prime Minister Mota Pinto appear to avoid some of the most controversial measures in his original draft, thus making it more likely to be passed. By softening taxation proposals and his stand on transferring government funds to local authorities, Mota Pinto may gain the support of the Social Democrats who could provide the winning margin. Even if the budget vote--likely in about three weeks--passes, he will remain vulnerable to increasing opposition to his government.

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
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SWITZERLAND: Nuclear Power Referendum


Swiss voters are expected tomorrow narrowly to defeat a measure that would end the development of nuclear power in Switzerland. The referendum caps a three-year effort by antinuclear groups. Federal officials, mindful of the successful antinuclear referendum in Austria last fall, have taken several steps to counter the anti-nuclear campaign. They have amended energy laws to provide for review by the Federal Council of license applications for new nuclear power facilities and have drafted a comprehensive new energy conservation and development program. The government also has joined in an effort to build public confidence in nuclear reactor safety. Voters are well aware that the country must import 80 percent of its energy needs, and they have been reminded that the sale of Swiss nuclear technology and expertise abroad would be damaged if the question is approved.

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